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 The eﬀect of Social Security rules on the age people choose to retire can be
critical in evaluating proposed changes to those rules. This research derives
a theory of retirement that views retirement as a special type of labor supply
decision. This decision is driven by wealth and substitution eﬀects on labor
supply, interacting with a ﬁxed cost of working that makes low hours of work
unattractive.
The theory is tractable analytically, and therefore well-suited for analyzing
proposals that aﬀect Social Security. This research examines how retirement
age varies with generosity of Social Security beneﬁts. A ten-percent reduction
in the value of beneﬁts would lead individuals to postpone retirement by be-
tween one-tenth and one-half a year. Individuals who are relatively buﬀered
from the change—because they are wealthier or because they are younger and
therefore can more easily increase saving to oﬀset the cut in beneﬁts—will
have smaller changes in their retirement ages.
1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of the age of retirement is crucial for the
ongoing discussions about Social Security reform. At a minimum, the age
of retirement should respond to (a) the resources available to the household
for retirement, (b) the marginal net earnings from an extra year of work and
(c) the health of the household members nearing retirement. To the extent
that these factors aﬀect the age of retirement, changes in public policy and
in health care technology will cause important movements in the average
age of retirement. Movements in the average age of retirement in turn have
important deadweight loss and budgetary consequences. We refer to the size
of the response of the age of retirement to these factors as the “retirement
elasticity.”
From an a priori theoretical point of view, there is good reason to think
that the retirement elasticity might be substantial. Although some people
gradually cut back their hours over many years as they move toward full
retirement, most retirees make a fairly sudden transition from working 20, 30,
40 or more hours per week to essentially zero hours. This sudden transition
strongly suggests the existence in many jobs of ﬁxed costs of going to work
that make it ineﬃcient to continue working but work only small number of
hours per week. If these costs are borne by the worker, the worker will insist
on working a substantial number of hours or not at all. If these costs are
1borne by the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm will insist on the worker putting in a substantial
number of hours or quitting entirely. The outcome will be similar either
way. Hours of work will make a discrete jump at some critical level of the
underlying determinants.
Kimball and Shapiro (2003) propose a model of consumption and labor
supply that (1) allows for the kind of ﬁxed costs that generate sudden transi-
tions between zero and substantial positive hours of work, (2) maintains the
traditional view that the income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply of a
permanent increase in the real wage should (approximately) cancel, and (3)
allows for nonseparability between consumption and labor. In this model,
there are two types of forces ultimately leading to retirement even when there
is no drop in the eﬀective wage W. One is the increasing disutility of work
with increasing age and declines in health. The other is the extra wealth
accumulated with each extra year of work, which creates a wealth eﬀect in
favor of retirement. The following section comes from Kimball and Shapiro
(2003), with minor modiﬁcations.
2 Structural Model of Labor Supply
Consider a two-member household with no bequest motive that faces uncer-
tainty about mortality but no other risks. Assume fair annuities and life
insurance are available but that there are no other risky assets. The house-













−rt[C − W1N1 − W2N2 − Π]
where C is total consumption expenditure by the household, N1 and N2 are
labor hours with corresponding after-tax wages W1 and W2, Π is government
lump-sum transfers and ν =( ν1,ν 2) is an exogenous vector of indicator
variables for who is alive. Consumption C, labor hours N1 and N2 and
transfers Π can be functions of the life-state ν as well as of time, while after-
tax wages W1 and W2 are functions only of time. Note that any eﬀect of
earnings on the expected present value of Social Security payments would
2need to show up in Wi(t). Π is only the lump-sum aspect to transfers.
The only signiﬁcance of time zero will be that it is a moment when new
information about life-time resources arrives. It can be at any point in the
life cycle. If the ﬂow of utility, consumption, labor hours and transfers are
uniformly zero when both members of the household are dead, and Γ =
{(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)} is the set of life-states when at least one person is alive,

















where p(ν,t) is the probability of a life-state. The form of the budget con-
straint reﬂects the existence of fair annuity and life-insurance markets.
The Lagrangian for (1) is






−ρt {U(C(ν,t),N 1(ν,t),N 2(ν,t),ν)
+λ0e
(ρ−r)t[W1(t)N1(ν,t)+W2(t)N2(ν,t)+Π ( ν,t) − C(ν,t)]
 
dt,
where the Lagrange multiplier λ0 is a scalar that is constant across both time
and life-states. Regardless of the shape of the utility function, maximizing
the intertemporal Lagrangian requires maximizing the integrand
I = U(C,N1,N 2,ν)+λ0e
(ρ−r)t[W1N1 + W2N2 +Π− C]( 3 )
at each time t and life-state ν. In particular, the integrand I needs to be
maximized even if the utility function is nonconcave because of ﬁxed costs
of going to work.1
1If one deﬁnes λ(t)=λ0e(ρ−r)t, the integrand diﬀers from the current-value Hamilto-
nian in Kimball and Shapiro (2003) only by the term λ(t)rA(t)—a term needed only to
get the Euler equation that integrates to λ(t)=λ0e(ρ−r)t.T h et e r mλ(t)rA(t)d o e sn o t
aﬀect the optimization over consumption and labor conditional on λ(t).
3In order to build in the observed cancellation of income and substitution







when α ∈ (0,1) and
U(C,N1,N 2)=ψ(ν)ln(C) − g(N1,N 2,t). (5)
when α =0 .α measures the degree of substitutability between consumption
and leisure—or equivalently, the degree of complementarity between consump-
tion and labor. α = 0 corresponds to additive separability, while α =1
corresponds to perfect substitutability between consumption and leisure.
α ∈ (0,1) corresponds to consumption being a partial substitute for leisure.
g(N1,N 2,t) is an increasing function of N1 and N2. We assume that the
household acts as a unit, maximizing the joint utility of its members. For any
given total amount of household expenditure, the utility from consumption
depends on how many people that expenditure is spread over. ψ(ν)i sa
household equivalence scale:
ψ(1,0) = ψ(0,1) = 1,
1 <ψ (1,1) ≤ 2
and
g(0,0) = 0.
It is possible to obtain some results that apply quite generally for any
shape of the disutility of work function g(N1,N 2,t). To deal with possi-
ble additive nonseparability between consumption and labor, it is helpful to
maximize ﬁrst over consumption conditional on labor quantities.

























Then total consumption equals baseline consumption plus the job-induced
consumption of each worker in the household:







Because it represents every interaction between work and consumption, “job-
induced consumption” must be construed quite broadly. It includes both
(1) work-related consumption (such as childcare, transportation to and from
work, the extra expense of food at work, and the extra expense of clothes
suitable for work), and (2) extra time-saving consumption (such as easy-to-
prepare foods at home, house-cleaning and house-repair services, and house-
hold conveniences).
Returning to the underlying expression for optimized consumption, and
substituting into the integrand I, the maximized integrand ¯ I is
¯ I = λ0e
(ρ−r)t
 









Maximizing I over C, N1 and N2 is the same as maximizing ¯ I over N1
and N2. This in turn requires solving the optimization subproblem
max
N1,N2




The structure of (10), the optimization subproblem for N1 and N2,i st h e
same regardless of the shape of g(N1,N 2,t). A model of endogenous retire-
ment calls for some sort of nonconcavity. Section 3 considers g(N1,N 2,t)
additively separable in N1 and N2 with employers allowing complete ﬂexi-
bility in work hours with proportional pay, but a ﬁxed utility cost of going
5to work. Conversely, Section 4 examines an employer-imposed restriction to
work ¯ N1 and ¯ N2 hours or not at all. In either case, the objective is to relate
endogenous retirement ages to the resources available to a household and to
a pair of multiplicative work aversion parameters M1 and M2. Section 5 con-
siders the case of a single-earner facing employer-imposed hours restrictions
and develops a set of numerical examples.
3 Endogenous Retirement and Labor Supply
with Fixed Costs of Going to Work
Before going on, one observation is in order. In the next section, an interior
solution for N1 and N2 is often relevant. Given the optimization subproblem,








































6Now, specify gi by
gi(Ni,t)=χ(Ni)Mi(t)[Fi + vi(Ni)], (15)
where χ is the indicator function for working:
χ(Ni)=
 
0i f Ni =0
1i f Ni > 0 .
Here Mi(t) is the “work aversion” factor, F is a positive number that models
the ﬁxed utility cost of going to work and vi is a function satisfying vi(0) = 0,
v 
i(N) > 0, v  
i (N) > 0a n dv 
i(168) = ∞.( N is measured in weekly hours. 24
hours a day, seven days a week is 168 hours a week.)
The additive separability of g(N1,N 2,t)i nN1 and N2 also means that







−(1−α)(ρ−r)tχ(Ni)Mi(t)[Fi + vi(Ni)]. (16)







Call the solution to this ﬁrst order condition N∗












Because this is a necessary condition for an optimum when Ni > 0, the
optimal Ni must be either N∗
i or 0. To determine whether the optimal Ni is
N∗




−(1−α)(ρ−r)tMi(t)[Fi + vi(Ni)] (18)
at Ni = 0 with its value at Ni = N∗
i t os e ew h i c ho n ei sg r e a t e r .
When Ni = 0, the criterion function (18) is equal to zero. When Ni = N∗
i ,









∗) − Fi} (19)





















i(N)−vi(N)] = Nv  
i (N) > 0 whenever N>0, Nv 
i(N)−vi(N)
is an increasing function of N. This, plus the assumption that v 
i(168) = ∞
guarantees that there is a unique solution to (20) between 0 and 168. In
terms of the cutoﬀ value N
#
i that solves equation (20), the rule for optimal




















In practice, we use empirical evidence to calibrate the cutoﬀ value N
#
i ,a n d
then determine the appropriate value of F. From this point of view, one can
see equation (20) the other way around as a mapping from the cutoﬀ value
N
#
i to the ﬁxed cost F. In terms of N
#










3.1 Behavior Near the Moment of Retirement
At the moment of planned retirement Ri, a worker must be exactly indiﬀerent
between working and not working, which also implies that ﬂexibly chosen
work hours will be N
#
i at that moment. Setting the criterion function (18)
equal to zero at N
#









As a result, by (13) and (22) , at the moment right before planned retirement,
















8How is the moment of retirement determined? A worker is indiﬀerent














or equivalently, taking the function lnv 










=( 1 − α)ln(λ0)+( 1− α)(ρ − r)Ri +l n ( Wi(Ri)) − ln(Mi(Ri))
It is quite reasonable to assume that (1 − α)(ρ − r)t +l n ( Wi(t)) − ln(Mi(t))
is single peaked, since wages will tend to go up fast with age at ﬁrst and
slower later on, while the disutility of work will go up slowly with age ﬁrst,
then faster later on. The assumption of single-peakedness to ln(v 
i(N∗(t)))
implies that the worker can be indiﬀerent to working versus not working at
most twice: once when he or she starts working and once when he or she
retires. It is straightforward to add in the eﬀects of an endogenous inception
of work, but for clarity, we will assume in the main text that time 0 is after
the inception of work for anyone in the household who will in fact work in
the future and deal with an endogenous inception of work only in footnotes.2
The structure involved in saying that it is a multiplicative aversion to
work parameter that evolves over time makes N
#
i constant. Also, given
that worker i is alive, equation (25), guarantees that the optimal retirement
age is not aﬀected by the death of a spouse. This is a reﬂection of (a) the
assumption of fair annuity and life insurance markets and (b) the additive
separability of g in N1 and N2. As for the other terms in equation (25),
it is important to distinguish between evolution over time according to an
undisturbed optimal plan and comparative-statics changes. We will analyze
the comparative statics of wealth eﬀect using a complete diﬀerential, trust-
ing that this use of the symbol d will not be confused with its use in the
integration diﬀerential dt. Wealth eﬀects operate through λ0 and can change
the optimal retirement age. The total diﬀerential of equation (25) needed to
ﬁnd out how much is
2Since the inception of work is not our focus, even then, we will abstract from the
eﬀects of endogenous education on the inception of work.

















Wi(Ri) − (1 − α)(ρ − r)
. (27)
The second-order condition implies that the denominator is positive around
the optimal retirement date. For the sake of interpretation, it is helpful to
use
B0 = B(0) = λ
−(1−α)
0 ψ(ν0)
from (7) in diﬀerential form
dlnB0 = −(1 − α)dlnλ0.
(The household equivalent scale for those alive at time zero ψ(ν0)w i l ln o tb e










Wi(Ri) − (1 − α)(ρ − r)
. (28)
3.2 The Eﬀect of Wealth Shocks on Initial Baseline
Consumption and the Optimal Retirement Age
What remains in order to ﬁnd the eﬀect of wealth shocks on the optimal
retirement age is to relate initial baseline consumption B0 to total resources.
The starting place for this is the budget constraint (2). Let us add the
expected present value of government transfers into initial ﬁnancial wealth
to get a combined concept of nonhuman wealth, A:







Also, since the additive separability of g and existence of fair annuities mar-
kets guarantee that both labor income and the job-induced consumption from
10each worker in the household depend only on whether that worker is alive,







































Equations (13) and (14) imply that
dJi(t)=αWi dNi + Ji(t)dlnB0 (33)
Equations (17) and (21) imply that, except in the right around the moment
of retirement (or right around the moment when work begins),
dNi(t)=−Ni(t)η(Ni(t))dlnB0 (34)








i (Ni(t)) if Ni =0
0i f Ni =0 .
(35)
Note that for wealth shocks, dWi(t)=dMi(t)=0 .





−rtqi(t)[ Ji(t) − Wi(t)Ni(t)]dt
=
























Then using (28), equation (36) becomes
d
  Ri
















−rtqi(t)Ji(t)dt +( 1− α)ηiHi (39)


















































Wi(Ri) − (1 − α)(ρ − r)
. (40)


























































Wi(Ri) − (1 − α)(ρ − r)
.
4 Hours Contraints Imposed by Employers
One feature of the foregoing model that may be unrealistic is the assumption
that workers can freely choose their hours. As the polar opposite case, sup-
pose instead that throughout a worker’s life, the only options for work hours
are zero and a ﬁxed number of weekly hours ¯ Ni imposed by the employer as a
condition of employment. (The constrained number of hours may diﬀer from
worker to worker depending on the type of jobs they tend to hold.) How
does this modify the equations above?
To begin with, optimal consumption given N1 and N2 is unaﬀected. Also,
the maximization subproblem for optimal labor hours is unchanged except






−(1−α)(ρ−r)tχ(Ni)Mi(t)[Fi + vi(Ni)]. (42)
Thus, the individual will work if
13Wi ¯ Ni − λ
−(1−α)
0 e
−(1−α)(ρ−r)tMi(t)[Fi + vi( ¯ Ni)]
is positive and be indiﬀerent to working and not working when this criterion
function is zero. At the moment of planned retirement, the individual will
be indiﬀerent between working and not working, so (23) becomes
Wi(Ri) ¯ Ni = λ
−(1−α)
0 e





(ρ−r)RiMi(Ri)[Fi + vi( ¯ Ni)]. (43)
Taking logarithms and collecting all of the constants on the left-hand-side of
the equation,
ln( ¯ Ni)−ln(Fi+vi( ¯ Ni))+ln(ψ(ν0)) = ln(B0)+(ρ−r)Ri+ln(Mi(Ri))−ln(Wi(Ri)).
(44)










Wi(Ri) − (1 − α)(ρ − r)
. (45)
The form of (45) is identical to the form of equation (28) that holds in
the absence of hours constraints. Without hours constraints, hours right
before retirement are always N
#
i . With hours constraints, hours right before
retirement are always ¯ Ni.
Finally, with hours constraints, job-induced consumption at the moment










−(1−α)(ρ−r)RiMi(Ri)[Fi + vi( ¯ Ni)]
= αWi(Ri) ¯ Ni. (46)
Following through the rest of the calculations for the retirement elasticity
















dln(B0) is given in (44) above.
5 A Numerical Illustration
Even the simplest numerical example that makes a serious attempt at be-
ing realistic is quite instructive. In this section, we calculate the retirement
elasticity for particular parameter values of a single-person household fac-
ing employer-imposed hours constraints. Given our analytic model outlined
above, these calculations are simple to carry out. We focus here simply on
a clear description of the calibration assumptions and a discussion of the
results. We consider how the age of retirement increases in response to a 10
percent decrease in the generosity of Social Security beneﬁts.
5.1 Calibration
For simplicity, consider an agent who would retire at age 65 in the absence of
any intervention, and we assume that both the real interest rate r and utility
discount rate are equal to 3 percent per year. Because of the employer-
imposed hours constraints, annual labor income is proportional to the real
wage. Without loss of generality, we can normalize the annual labor income
to 1 at age 65. Before retirement, we assume a quadratic wage proﬁle hitting
its maximum at age 55 and falling at a rate of 5 percent per year at age 65.
Denoting the agent’s age by a,
W ¯ N =1 .25 − .0025(a − 55)
2
Initial ﬁnancial and pension wealth is represented in ratio to the wage at the
age a0 at which the agent ﬁnds out about a change to the Social Security
rules. This allows a closer relationship with the way the data appear, but
it should be kept in mind that current annual labor income is a moving
yardstick. We consider values of 0 and 5 years for the ﬁnancial and pension
wealth to labor income ratio.
The current Social Security rules make it realistic to assume that Social
Security payments are constant in real terms and that the adjustments for
15early or late retirement do not change the annuity value of the Social Security
payments. That is, beneﬁts are indexed for changes in the cost of living.
Moreover, within the relevant range, changing retirement age leads to an
actuarially-fair adjustment in the annuity. We express the level of Social
Security payments in terms of the replacement rate relative to the ﬁnal annual
wage income for someone who retires at 65. We consider a replacement rate
of 0.4 and 0.7 to represent the eﬀects of Social Security for those with higher
and lower income.
Another important element of the calibration is to calibrate mortality.
Here it is important to realize that mortality probabilities matter primarily
in the calculation of the values of annuities. In order to have a compact and
tractable representation of mortality, we looked for an expression for survival
probabilities that was the sum or diﬀerence of two exponential functions that
did a good job of matching annuity values as seen from the perspective of
the years leading up to retirement. Given our assumptions of a 3 percent
real interest rate and focus on an agent retiring at age 65 to begin with, the




where q is the survival probability, a is age as above and ∝ is the symbol for




e.0035(a0−92) − e.0535(a0−92) ,
where a0 is the agent’s age at time zero. It is clear that this calibration of
mortality has the counterfactual implication that everyone dies by age 92,
but it implies somewhat lower than actual mortality at ages earlier on (but
after 65) so that the annuity values for preretirement ages are on track. These
annuity values are within 1 percent of those implied by life tables (for men
and women combined) for each age from 50 to 64. Moreover, the mortality
probabilities leading up to age 65 are close enough that the probability of
dying between any age later than 50 years old and age 65 is within 2 percent
of what the life tables imply. Given the accuracy of the annuity values
and the mortality probabilities before age 65, close study of the relevant
equations indicates that the divergence of the mortality probabilities from
the life tables after age 65 will not aﬀect our calculated retirement elasticities
in any important way.
16The assumption of employer-imposed hours constraints makes it unnec-
essary to know the path of the multiplicative disutility of work M other than
the value of M /M at the initial age of retirement, 65. We consider a wide





the growth rate of the disutility of work.
5.2 Results
The results for the various cases are presented in Table 1 through Table 4.
Overall, for those with a modest rate of growth of the disutility of work,
the eﬀect on the retirement age of a 10 percent decrease in the generosity
of Social Security payments is on the order of half a year for those close to
retirement and on the order of a quarter of a year for those about 50 years old
when they ﬁnd out about the policy change. These changes are substantial,
though not overwhelming.
The tables illustrate the eﬀect of varying key parameters.
o Obviously, the wealthier is an individual or the lower the replacement
rate, the smaller the eﬀect on retirement age of the cut in beneﬁts.
Social Security beneﬁts are a smaller fraction of such individuals’ total
wealth, so a change in their value has a smaller impact on decisions.
(Compare Tables 1 and 3 or Tables 2 and 4.)
o The older an individual is when the change in policy is announced,
the bigger the change in retirement age. Older individuals have less
time over which to spread the increased saving required to smooth
consumption before and after retirement with the lower level of beneﬁts.
(Read down the tables.)
o The more rapidly the disutility of work is increasing, the less sensitive
is retirement age to the decrease in beneﬁts. For those individuals
with rapidly increasing disutility of work, this consideration damps the
ﬁnancial consideration of working longer. Increasing disutility of work
is analogous to decreasing health status, which would operate similarly.
(Read across the tables.)
17To the extent that our assumption that the wage will be declining at 5
percent per year at age 65 is inaccurate, the wide range of values for m allow
one to partially adjust for this. Abstracting from the modest eﬀects on the
measurement of the value of human capital if the wage path is diﬀerent, one
can adjust for a lower rate of decline in the wage at age 65 by looking at
a column labeled with a lower value of m. Similarly, one can adjust for a
higher rate of decline in the wage at age 65 by looking at the column labeled
with a higher value of m.
Without explicit modeling, one can see intuititively that for an agent who
is liquidity constrained up to a certain age, the age at which the liquidity
constraint ﬁnally loosens is relevant, rather than the age at which the policy
change is announced. Thus, liquidity constraints may make the entries for
higher ages relevant. Unless there is pension wealth, the tables with zero
wealth at that age are the appropriate ones. This reasoning is why we have
started the tables at age 50, since we suspect that many households are
liquidity constrained until about age 50, but it would be easy to extend the
tables to earlier ages.
6 Discussion
Some of the ﬁndings from the theory are (1) the theoretical distinction be-
tween the magnitude of the retirement elasticity and the magnitude of the
ordinary extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, (2) the importance
of the degree of age-dependence of the disutility of work for the retirement
elasticity and (3) the importance of focusing the calibration of the degree of
nonseparability between consumption and labor on the behavior of consump-
tion at retirement rather than on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
per se, and (4) the dependence of the eﬀect of wealth shocks on how long
before retirement the household ﬁnds out about the wealth shock.
This model provides a precise context for analyzing the impact of wealth
on retirement. It can be used to study how individuals will change the
timing of their retirement in response to announced changes in Social Security
(e.g., from a shift to individual plans, changes in the normal retirement age,
or changes in the eﬀective rate of taxation of labor earnings once Social
Security payments have already begun). The eﬀects of policy changes on the
average retirement age depend critically on one unknown parameter-the rate
of increase of the disutility of work with age.
18If there is any signiﬁcant eﬀect of policy changes on the average retirement
age, policy analysis based on the faulty assumption that retirement ages
would not change (or would change very little) could be badly misleading.
Taking full account of the retirement elasticity is especially important when
the number of people nearing retirement but not yet retired is large. This is
exactly the situation the impending retirement of the Baby Boom generation
creates.
For example, suppose that cuts in Social Security beneﬁts cause people
to choose to retire later than they otherwise would and that this additional
work generates additional tax revenue. Then the size of cuts needed to restore
solvency to Social Security might be smaller, but two new issues arise.
1. An important part of the extra tax revenue from the later retirement
induced by the Social Security policy change might show up as an in-
crease in general income tax revenue, both personal and corporate.
Logically speaking, this extra income tax revenue should be credited
to the Social Security policy change, but giving due credit in this case
would require solid evidence of the magnitude of the retirement elas-
ticity.
2. Whatever revenue beneﬁts accrue from the later retirement are just
as large when the beneﬁt cuts apply only to those who have not yet
retired as when they are applied to retirees. In other words, what under
an analysis ignoring the retirement elasticity would be considered $1
billion in beneﬁt cuts that will apply to those not yet retired may have
a budgetary eﬀect considerably larger than $1 billion, while $1 billion
of beneﬁt cuts on those already retired would have only $1 billion worth
of budgetary eﬀect.
The second point, about the retirement elasticity mattering more for one
group (the not-yet-retired) than another (the already retired), applies to
other distinctions as well. In particular, the retirement elasticity should be
higher for those in good health than for those in poor health. This point
suggests the budgetary (and welfare) beneﬁts of concentrating cuts on the
more able-bodied, and exempting those for whom later retirement would
represent a greater hardship. This policy would involve making the disability-
linked component (as opposed to the across-the board component) to Social
Security more important.
19As another example of how the retirement elasticity could matter, con-
sider a policy change that would reward later retirement with higher monthly
Social Security payments at what under the standard analysis would be con-
sidered more than an actuarially fair rate. This might make sense budgetarily
if all revenue eﬀects (including general income tax revenue eﬀects) of later
retirement were taken into account. The size of the welfare gains from this
eﬃciency-enhancing measure would be greater the greater the retirement
elasticity. Not only are such welfare gains worthwhile in and of themselves,
their inclusion in a needed package of reforms could be important in helping
to generate political support for that package of reforms.
Among those not yet retired, the dependence of the retirement elasticity
on the age at which people ﬁnd out about a policy change can also have
important policy implications. For example, if those near retirement respond
to an announced cut primarily by planning to retire later, while those far from
retirement respond primarily by cutting consumption, the larger retirement
elasticity for those near retirement means that they generate more extra
income-tax revenue than those who are further away from retirement. This
eﬀect could provide an important budgetary issue that calls into question
the usual presumption that those near retirement should always be exempted
from any future beneﬁt cuts.
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20Table 1. 
Response of Retirement Age to a 10 Percent Reduction in the Value of Social Security Benefits: 
Low Income, Low Wealth Household 
              
   m  0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
age    Increase in retirement age (years) 
50    0.36 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 
51    0.38 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 
52    0.40 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 
53    0.41 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 
54    0.43 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 
55    0.46 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 
56    0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 
57    0.50 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 
58    0.52 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 
59    0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.27 
60    0.58 0.53 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.29 
61    0.60 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.31 
62    0.63 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34 
63    0.66 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.36 
64    0.69 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.39 
65      0.72 0.67 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42 
Notes:  Replacement rate is 0.7.  Wealth/labor-income ratio is 0. 
m = M'(R)/M(R), the growth rate of the disutility of work at retirement age. 
 Table 2. 
Response of Retirement Age to a 10 Percent Reduction in the Value of Social Security Benefits: 
Low Income, High Wealth Household 
              
   m  0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
age    Increase in retirement age (years) 
50    0.30 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 
51    0.31 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 
52    0.32 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 
53    0.34 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 
54    0.35 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 
55    0.37 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 
56    0.39 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 
57    0.40 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 
58    0.42 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 
59    0.44 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 
60    0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 
61    0.49 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 
62    0.52 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 
63    0.54 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 
64    0.57 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29 
65      0.60 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.31 
Notes:  Replacement rate is 0.7.  Wealth/labor-income ratio is 5. 
m = M'(R)/M(R), the growth rate of the disutility of work at retirement age. 
 
 Table 3. 
Response of Retirement Age to a 10 Percent Reduction in the Value of Social Security Benefits: 
High Income, Low Wealth Household 
              
   m  0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
age    Increase in retirement age (years) 
50    0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 
51    0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 
52    0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 
53    0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
54    0.27 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 
55    0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 
56    0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 
57    0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 
58    0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 
59    0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 
60    0.38 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 
61    0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.22 
62    0.42 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 
63    0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 
64    0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 
65      0.49 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 
Notes:  Replacement rate is 0.4.  Wealth/labor-income ratio is 0. 
m = M'(R)/M(R), the growth rate of the disutility of work at retirement age. 
 
 Table 4. 
Response of Retirement Age to a 10 Percent Reduction in the Value of Social Security Benefits: 
High Income, High Wealth Household 
              
   m  0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
age    Increase in retirement age (years) 
50    0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
51    0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 
52    0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
53    0.21 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 
54    0.22 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 
55    0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 
56    0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 
57    0.25 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 
58    0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 
59    0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 
60    0.30 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 
61    0.31 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 
62    0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 
63    0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 
64    0.37 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 
65      0.39 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 
Notes:  Replacement rate is 0.4.  Wealth/labor-income ratio is 5. 
m = M'(R)/M(R), the growth rate of the disutility of work at retirement age. 
 
 